On June 24th, the Shattuck Center for Human Rights at the Department of Public Policy held the 8th edition of the Lemkin Reunion workshop series at CEU Vienna under the title “Genocide and genocidal intent in Ukraine? Taking stock of three years of legal and political debates”. Following a first Lemkin Reunion workshop on the discussion around genocide in Ukraine in 2024, this year’s meeting sought to draw a first balance of the debates within and beyond Ukraine on how to qualify Russia’s actions in Ukraine. The war and the atrocities committed have put the understanding and definition of genocide on the map again – legally, politically, but also in its consequences for the implementation of international law. After the start of the aggression in February 2022, the interpretation of Russia’s actions as driven by genocidal intent has received intense scholarly attention. In the tradition of past editions of the Shattuck Center’s Lemkin Reunion, presenters and discussants zoomed in on shifting understandings of genocide. Considering these debates, in which way can the term genocide be used – legally, politically, but also for a defense of the victims of human rights violations and atrocities? What can we learn from the discussions on Russian genocidal intent in Ukraine – and what has changed since 2022?
As a first intervention, Dmytro Koval, Associate Professor at the Department of International and European Law of the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, focused on how the debates around Russian genocidal intent in Ukraine interrelate with the outlook of a future peace agreement in Ukraine. How might peace negotiations in the months or years to come impact how genocide is addressed? For this, he zoomed in on a factual lens (what facts and signs for genocidal actions do we have?), a geopolitical lens (where exactly are genocidal actions taking place and in which way are the accusations of genocide taken seriously at the international level?), and a practical lens (which abilities do authorities have to actually investigate and persecute genocide?). For this, he first revisited the different attempts for a serious case-building on the matter so far – and that the most serious accusations for genocidal intent circle around the cases of the deportation of Ukrainian children to Russia, their renaming, adaptation, relocation, and reeducation/russification. He emphasized that specifically the “intent to return” after the war has ended presents the dividing line between genocidal forms of deportation from other motivations to relocate the children. He furthermore emphasized that the widespread locations where genocidal actions had been committed all along the front lines in Ukraine underline that there might be an overall genocidal intention.
Dmytro Koval also revisited Lemkin’s take on the role of cultural destruction as possible part of genocidal actions and intentions – but that international courts today show a hesitancy to consider this as it seems much harder to prove as compared to the intention to physically destroy a whole social group. Yet, the fact that many Russians would consider Ukraine as a “Russian space” makes this especially difficult, as in many Russian eyes it is not about destroying a Ukrainian society and population, but only about dealing with extremist Ukrainian nationalism in an otherwise Russian space. This fact, after Koval, shows how important a (post)colonial lens on Russian politics is in the contemporary.
Turning to the other lenses, Dmytro Koval highlighted that any peace agreement meant to be sustainable will have to address the high demand for justice and accountability within Ukrainian society. Genocide investigations may be impossible to integrate into peace processes under conditions of negotiations with the current regime in Russia – but peace will hardly be achievable without the Ukrainian population perceiving it as just and fair. From this perspective, genocide as a concept and as an investigation process is necessary. Also, UN institutions cannot be part of agreements that include any amnesties for genocidal crimes – which might create additional hurdles for future negotiations with Russia.
In his conclusion, Koval stressed that without investigating genocidal actions, no sustainable peace agreement seems possible. He added that we might not necessarily need to use the term “genocide”, but that any promising peace process needs to address the demands for justice and accountability.
Next, Victoriia Khalanchuk, senior lecturer at the Law Faculty of National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” (NaUKMA), presented her recent work and discussed how looking for motives of waging war could problemitise the leadership element of the crime of aggression and contextual element in identifying special intention in the crime of genocide. She noted that while the crime of aggression does not engage with the underlying motives for waging war, the crime of genocide — when committed during wartime — addresses the intent behind such acts through the legal requirement of specific intent. However, one of the challenges in naming the crime of genocide lies in the difficulty of distinguishing between different motives for an aggression, even though necessity of this distinction is disputable for legal argumentation.
She revisited the different arguments and understandings for Russia’s actions – and the difficult task of scrutinizing whether the motivations to wage war and to destroy the Ukrainian nation as protected group overlap.
First, she addressed whether the intent required for the crime of genocide could be derived from general context if it is typical for territorial conquest. Second, she problematized whether it could be assumed that actions committed during the aggression are without a specific intent pointing to the crime of genocide, if they result in group destruction. Third, she discussed how a better understanding of the Russian political system could inform the assessment of context and discussions on the mental element. Finally, she questioned whether forcing to land concessions enable genocide.
In doing so, Khalanchuk discussed recent findings around the causes of war conceptualized by historical sociologist Michael Mann, making use of political theory on the responsibility under dictatorship and the importance of international criminal justice by Hannah Arendt as well as the political regime approach and empirical evidence from the Russia-occupied Ukrainian territory.
Her presentation underlined that aggression, covering imperial territorial conquest, and genocidal intent do not need to go together necessarily. But that they do in the case of Russia’s actions. This finding urges to revise legal approaches to the issue of individual responsibility for aggression and the identification of genocide.
Lastly, Patryk Labuda, assistant professor of international law and international relations at CEU in Vienna added to this and presented his research making use of (post)colonial lenses. He analysed the imperial consciousness and colonial mentality present in contemporary Russia. Against this background, prosecuting Putin for war crimes and including non-Western understandings of colonialism remains important. He revisited the current proposals and discussions for a concrete international tribunal to investigate the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine, to prosecute Russian officials in the future (except for the Troika at the head of the Russian state). An international coalition of countries appears to back the idea that holding officials accountable for the crimes committed in Ukraine presents an opportunity to raise questions of postcolonial justice. Many countries in the Global South do not perceive the conflict in Ukraine as connected to them and do not easy acknowledge its postcolonial character. Especially since Russia also constantly claims postcolonial intentions. However, the fact that many countries also beyond the immediate neighborhood of Ukraine support the idea of a tribunal shows that in the field of Human Rights and international law often regional initiatives pave the road for a broader international consensus.
In this light, Patryk Labuda acknowledged the flaws and shortcomings of any consensus around the planned tribunal, but highlighted how it might present an opportunity to create a first step of accountability. Furthermore, that we need to engage more in how to make use of postcolonial perspectives and sharpen their meaning.
The presentations were followed by lively discussions and have shown that the debates around Russia’s genocidal intent in Ukraine might lead to a reshaping of the concept of genocide, its application to international law, as well as its connections to other serious (war) crimes. The Shattuck Center will continue to engage in these debates and thanks presenters and participants wholeheartedly for their insights and for sharing their expertise with us.